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HILLS V. GAUTREAUX: WHEN A FEDERAL
COURT MAY GRANT AN INTERDISTRICT
REMEDY IN THE ABSENCE OF AN
INTERDISTRICT VIOLATION
Remedial relief which encompasses the metropolitan area surround-
ing a central city is often demanded to rectify unconstitutional segrega-
tion in central city schools and housing. The growing pattern of resi-
dential segregation which separates the black central city from its
white suburbs' makes it increasingly difficult to provide integrated
educational and housing opportunities through remedial action limited
to the city alone. Metropolitan remedies, however, will often affect
suburban governments that are innocent of constitutional violations. 2
1. Relying on 1960 census figures sociologist Karl E. Taueuber used a scale from zero
(no segregation) to 100 (complete segregation) to analyze the degree of racial separation
in 207 cities. Half the cities had segregation ratings above 87, a quarter exceeded 91, and
only 8 cities rated below 70. NAT'L COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, How
THE GOVERNMENT BUILDS GHETTOS 20-21 (Oct. 1968). The situation has become even
worse in recent years as blacks migrate to our cities while whites and jobs leave. Today
40.5% of whites live within the central city, compared with 78% of blacks. U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 125
(1975). Between 1960 and 1970, for each new job created in the central city, nearly three
new jobs were created in the suburbs. E. ERBER. HOUSING ALLOCATION PLANS: A
NATIONAL OVERVIEW 809 (Nat'l Comm. Against Discrimination in Housing, May 1974).
2. Although segregative practices may not be proven on the part of suburbs in a
particular case so as to make them legally responsible, it is difficult to see the suburbs as
morally "innocent." Segregation cases involve problems which are merely symptoms of
the deteriorating nature of our cities. The central cities have huge problems, e.g., crime,
overcrowding, unemployment, poor public schools, degenerative neighborhoods, which
are worsened by the fact that the well-to-do whites and the resources they control have
moved to the suburbs. With a diminishing tax base, the cities cannot begin to cope with
their problems. See Freilich, Down with the Doughnut-Up with the Whole: The Need for
Metropolitan Relief in School and Housing Integration, 7 URBAN LAW. xiii (1975); Grad,
The City is Here to Stay, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 15.
Chicago is a prime example of what happens to an inner city which has been deserted
by its white residents.
Between 1960 and 1970 Chicago lost 500,000 whites and gained 33,000 Blacks, lost
220 factories, 760 stores, and 229,000 jobs, and gained 90,000 welfare recipients,
lost 140,000 private housing units and gained 19,000 public housing units. These
losses represent 12% of the housing, 14% of the jobs, 17% of the stores and 18% of
the whites in terms of 1960 assets. The suburbs of Chicago, meanwhile have gained
800,000 whites, 350,000 private housing units and 500,000 jobs. In 1970, 64% of the
metropolitan area unemployed, 75% of the families below the poverty level, 76% of
the Spanish-speaking, 85% of the welfare recipients and 90% of the blacks lived in
Chicago.
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In Hills v. Gautreaux,3 the United States Supreme Court held that even
though innocent suburban governments might be affected, a federal
court order requiring the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) to extend remedial action throughout a metropolitan area
was not "impermissible as a matter of law." 4
In Gautreaux, residents in and applicants for public housing in
Chicago sued the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) alleging that it
had selected project locations and tenants based on procedures which
"avoided the placement of Negro families in white neighborhoods.' 5
Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a class action against HUD for assisting
CHA in its discriminatory policy by providing financial support for
CHA's housing projects. The district court entered summary judgment
against CHA and eventually consolidated the suits for consideration of
a remedy. 6
Plaintiffs sought a remedial order encompassing the metropolitan
area, maintaining that the city of Chicago was so segregated7 that any
remedy confined to the Chicaga city limits could not provide an ade-
quate number of project locations in white neighborhoods. 8 The dis-
trict court rejected plaintiffs' argument and limited its remedial order
to the city of Chicago. 9 Although the Seventh Circuit reversed and
refused to discuss the validity of a specific metropolitan plan,' 0 the
AND THE REPELLENT OF THE SELF-DESTRUCT GHETTO 1 (Working Paper 11. 14, Chicago
Regional Hospital Study, Oct. 1972).
3. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
4. Id. at 306.
5. Id. at 286.
6. 425 U.S. at 287, 290.
7. Data compiled by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights supports this contention.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN
HOUSING 130 (1975).
8. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub
nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
9. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Hills
v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
10. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub
nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). It is important to note that because the
Seventh Circuit did not endorse a specific remedy but remanded the case to the district
court for further consideration of metropolitan relief, the Supreme Court did not review
the validity of a particular order. 425 U.S. at 301. Some features of the actual order,
however, may be surmised from references by the Court. Metropolitan relief would
require that HUD fund only projects which provide integrated housing opportunities for
residents of the housing projects. Id. Because of the segregated nature of the city of
Chicago (see note 2 supra), the new guidelines for integration by which HUD must
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court held that it was "necessary and equitable that any remedial plan
to be effective must be on a suburban or metropolitan basis."'" The
Supreme Court affirmed, focusing on whether metropolitan relief is
permissible when innocent governmental units are located within the
remedial area. The Court concluded that metropolitan relief directed to
HUD would not "necessarily entail coercion of uninvolved govern-
mental units"' 2 and was therefore permissible.
A metropolitan remedy is an equitable device which attempts to
rectify the plaintiff's injury.' 3 A federal court's power to order equita-
ble relief has traditionally been viewed as very broad and flexible.' 4 In
fashioning an appropriate equitable remedy, the emphasis is on the
effectiveness of the relief in alleviating the wrong suffered by the
injured party. If the relief is effective, it is generally permissible even
if administratively awkward, bizarre, or inconvenient.' 5 Furthermore,
courts are afforded particularly wide latitude in granting relief pertain-
ing to matters of significant public interest,16 such as eliminating segre-
gation in housing and education. 7
The courts' equitable powers may, however, be limited by our
system of federalism.'" In cases where metropolitan relief would affect
evaluate housing applications will apply not only to applications from the city, but also to
applications from the suburban areas surrounding Chicago.
11. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub
nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
12. 425 U.S. at 298.
13. Chief Justice Burger described the nature of an equitable remedy in Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974): "[Ihe remedy is necessarily designed, as all remedies
are, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
occupied in the absence of such conduct."
14. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)
("Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of the district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent
in equitable remedies."); Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,329-30 (1944) ("The qualities of
mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and recon-
ciliation between public interest and private needs as well as between competing private
claims.").
16. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) (When the
public interest is involved, "courts of equity may and frequently do, go much farther
both to give and withhold relief. . . than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved.").
17. That is in our "public interest" not to tolerate segregation and to promote
desegregation is clearly expressed in federal statutes. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1447, 1971, 1975, 2000(a)-2000(h), 2204, 2205 (1970); Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970).
18. See generally Hart, The Relationship Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 489 (1954).
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governmental entities which are innocent of constitutional or statutory
violations, a federal court must weigh its duty as a court of equity
against its duty to respect the autonomy of the states and their political
subdivisions. 9 Unless the court is presented with proof of substantial
injury which requires relief2° and is convinced that no less drastic
alternatives are available,2' interference with state activities is imper-
19. This duty is derived from our concept of federalism. The Supreme Court recently
emphasized that federalism principles, which were first expounded in cases of conflict
between state and federal courts, apply equally to cases where equitable relief is sought
in a federal court against a state or local governmental agency. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362 (1976). See note 20 infra. Although it did not involve a court's equity power National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), emphasized the duty of the federal
government to respect the states and their political subdivisions. The "[Tenth] Amend-
ment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a
federal system." Id. at 843. The Court held that the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which extended the Act's wage and hour provisions to almost all em-
ployees of the states and their subdivisions, were not within the authority granted to
Congress by the commerce clause. Id.
H.M. Hart Jr. has argued that this duty is implied in the Eleventh Amendment of the
Federal Constitution: "Judicial mandates to nonjudicial state officers . . . requiring the
performance of affirmative acts are relatively infrequent. . . [A]n action to compel the
performance of an affirmative act would encounter, ordinarily, the bar of the Eleventh
Amendment." Hart, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 516 (1954).
20. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Supreme Court held that the
district court had abused its discretion by ordering the Philadelphia police department to
adopt a comprehensive plan for dealing with civilian complaints. In response to plain-
tiff's claim that they were entitled to federal equitable relief when a state agency did not
take steps to reduce unconstitutional police procedures, the Court declared that "impor-
tant considerations of federalism. . . [weigh] against" this position. Id. at 377-81. The
Court emphasized that interference with the state agency was impermissible since there
had been no showing of a substantial injury which demanded relief. The discriminatory
action was not the result of an official policy but was the result of irresponsible action on
the part of two officers.
Where there has been a showing of a substantial injury which warrants interference
with state activities, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to grant the necessary relief.
See, e.g., AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946). The Court in Watson held that plaintiffs
were entitled to an injunction against the Florida Attorney General to enjoin enforce-
ment of the provision of the Florida Constitution which prohibited employees from
entering closed shop agreements. Id. at 586. The Court acknowledged that "where a
federal court of equity is asked to interfere with the enforcement of state laws, it should
do so only 'to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent.' " Id. at 593. The
Court held that plaintiffs had met this strict test by demonstrating that enforcement of
this law resulted in the injury to the collective bargaining processes, the unions, and the
employees.
21. E.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), where the Supreme Court
reversed the district court which had ordered reapportionment legislation after finding
that the present multi-member district for the election of state senators and representa-
tives served to dilute the political power of the black ghetto. The Supreme Court
emphasized that:
(Vol. 13:251
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol13/iss1/15
INTERDISTRICT REMEDIES
missible. The Gautreaux opinion indicates that in cases where met-
ropolitan relief is sought, the degree to which the state's activities are
affected by the remedy will be a significant factor in determining
whether the interference is permissible. 22
Two years before Hills v. Gautreaux, the Supreme Court faced
these conflicting principles in the context of school desegregation. In
Milliken v. Bradleyu the Court held that the district court had abused
its discretion in ordering a metropolitan remedy which encompassed
fifty-four independent school districts, fifty-three of which were inno-
cent suburban school districts surrounding Detroit. 24 The suburban
districts were not parties to the orignial action and there was no claim
that they had committed constitutional violations. The Court asserted
that because the scope of the remedy exceeded the nature and extent
of the constitutional violation, the order could not stand. 25
Many commentators thought the Court in Milliken had announced a
per se rule that relief could not extend beyond the municipal bound-
aries of the city where the violation occurred. 26 Justice Stewart's
concurrence, however, left open the possibility that the Court had
The court entered judgment without expressly putting aside on supportable grounds
the alternative of creating single-member districts in the ghetto and leaving the
district otherwise intact, as well as the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment
could be satisfied by a simple requirement that some of the at-large candidates each
year must reside in the ghetto.
Id. at 160.
22. 425 U.S. at 305-06.
23. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). In 1972 plaintiffs brought a class action, alleging that the
Detroit public school system was racially segregated as a result of the official policies of
the state of Michigan and the Detroit School Board.
24. Id. at 719. The court relied on the following aspects of the case to support its
holding: there was no evidence in the record that the school districts surrounding Detroit
had operated segregated schools or committed acts which affected segregation within
other districts, id. at 745; there was no claim or finding that school district boundary
lines had been established with the purpose of promoting racial segregation, id. at 751;
and there had been no opportunity for the other school districts which had been included
to be heard on the propriety of multidistrict relief, id. at 752.
25. Id. at 744-45. As the Court stated "an interdistrict remedy might be in order
where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial
segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn
on the basis of races." Id. at 745. "[W]ithout an interdistrict violation and interdistrict
effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy." Id.
26. Note, Race Relations and Supreme Court Decision-Making: Jurisprudential Re-
flections, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 91, 104-05 (1975) (Milliken "is nothing less than an
emasculation of the egalitarian and humanitarian goals of Brown"); 9 U. RICH. L. REv.
361, 368 (1975) (Milliken "effectively quashes the hopes of those who had earlier
perceived a remedy to the racial demography of our large metropolitan areas.").
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based its holding on facts unique to school desegregation cases. 27
Although Gautreaux presented a slightly different question,28 the
Court clarified this confusion about Milliken and indicated that met-
ropolitan relief would be permissible in some circumstances.
After ten years of litigation, 29 the question finally presented to the
Supreme Court by Gautreaux was whether, in light of Milliken, inter-
district relief could be granted for discrimination in public housing
without an interdistrict violation.30 Although the Supreme Court af-
firmed the Seventh Circuit by holding that interdistrict relief was not
impermissible as a matter of law, it was critical of the court of appeals'
reasoning. 31 The Supreme Court concluded that a metropolitan remedy
27. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (Stewart, J., concurring).
In the present posture of the case, therefore, the Court does not deal with questions
of substantive constitutional law. The basic issue now before the Court concerns,
rather the appropriate exercise of federal equity jurisdiction . . . . This is not to
say, however, that an interdistrict remedy of the sort approved by the Court of
Appeals would not be proper, or even necessary, in other factual situations.
Id. at 753.
28. In Milliken the metropolitan order sought was directed to an agency of the state
of Michigan and would have required the consolidation of independent, innocent school
districts. Thus, the question was whether the innocent governmental entities may be
ordered (either directly or indirectly through an order to the state) to participate in
remedial action. In Gautreaux the metropolitan order sought was directed to HUD, a
federal agency, and provided guidelines for the selection of housing applications. Thus
the question in Gautreaux was to what degree the HUD order may interfere with the
activities of local governments. Gautreaux did not address the question of whether
innocent governmental entities may be forced to participate in a metropolitan remedial
order.
29. For a summary of the Gautreaux litigation, see Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan
Desegregation After Milliken v. Bradley: The Case for Land Use Litigation Strategies, 24
CATH. U.L. REv. 187, 197-98 n.47 (1975).
30. 425 U.S. at 292.
31. The Supreme Court was critical of two major aspects of the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning. First, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in holding
Milliken inapplicable to Gautreaux, and cautioned that Milliken was not to be interpreted
to merely require a "balancing of the particular considerations presented by school
desegregation cases." 425 U.S. at 294. The Court emphasized that the Milliken decision
"rejecting the metropolitan area desegregation order was actually based on fundamental
limitations on the remedial powers of the federal courts to restructure the operation of
local and state governmental entities." Id. at 293. Secondly, the Supreme Court dis-
agreed with the Seventh Circuit's holding that there had been a violation on the part of
the suburbs. Although the Seventh Circuit had held Milliken to be inapplicable to
Gautreaux, it continued to apply the Milliken test, concluding that the test had been met
because there was evidence of a discriminatory violation on the part of the suburbs. 503
F.2d at 937. In the order denying a rehearing, the Seventh Circuit also found an
interdistrict segregative effect produced by the segregation in the city. Id. at 939-40.
The Supreme Court found no support for either conclusion. The sole basis for the
determination by the Seventh Circuit that there had been a violation on the part of the
suburbs was an exhibit which showed the location of housing projects within the Chicago
metropolitan area but outside Chicago city limits. According to the Supreme Court, this
[Vol. 13:251
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was appropriate because HUD, which operated on a metropolitan wide
basis, 32 was responsible for the segregation. 33 The order to HUD would
not impermissibly interfere with innocent governmental entities within
the metropolitan area because of the autonomy retained by the local
governments. The Court noted that an order directed solely to HUD
would not force local governments to apply for HUD funds but would
merely reinforce the regulations that HUD uses to determine which
housing projects it will fund.34 The Court also pointed out that under
exhibit had been interpreted improperly by the Seventh Circuit. The exhibit had been
introduced to illustrate the scarcity of integrated housing opportunities for plaintiff's
class. Counsel for respondents, when introducing the exhibit, "expressly attempted to
avoid the possible misconception" that he was asserting the suburbs were guilty of a
violation. The Supreme Court was equally critical of the Seventh Circuit's finding of a
segregative effect: "The Court of Appeals' speculation about the effects of the dis-
criminatory site selection in Chicago is contrary both to expert testimony in the record
and the conclusion of the District Court." 425 U.S. at 294-95 n.11.
32. 425 U.S. at 299. That the relevant geographical area is the Chicago housing
market or the metropolitan area, rather than the Chicago city limits, is evident upon
examination of federal guidelines and HUD's own policies. The Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970), directs HUD to "administer its housing programs
on a regional basis to achieve equal opportunity in housing." Rubinowitz & Dennis,
School Desegregation Versus Public Housing Desegregation: The Local School District
and the Metropolitan Housing District, 10 URBAN L. ANN. 145, 167 (1975). See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3605, 3608(d)(5) (1970). The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 also
emphasizes regional cooperation:
Activities assisted under this section shall, to the maximum extent feasible, cover
entire areas having common or related development problems. The Secretary shall
encourage cooperation in preparing and carrying out plans among all interested
municipalities, political subdivisions, public agencies, and other parties in order to
achieve coordinated development of entire areas.
HCDA § 401(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4231 (Supp. IV 1974) (cross reference to 40 U.S.C. §461(a)
(Supp. IV 1974)). "[lit is further the intent of this section to encourage comprehensive
planning on a unified basis for States, cities, counties, metropolitan areas, districts,
regions,. . . and the establishment and development of the organizational units needed
therefore." 40 U.S.C. § 461(f) (Supp. IV 1974). Id. § 401.
In its administration of federal housing assistance programs, HUD recognizes "hous-
ing market areas" which encompass "the geographic area 'within which all dwelling
units. . .' are in competition with one another as alternatives for the users of housing."
425 U.S. at 299, quoting INSTITUTE FOR URBAN LAND USE AND HOUSING STUDIES,
HOUSING MARKET ANALYSIS: A STUDY OF THEORY AND METHODS, c.2 (1953). "The
housing market area 'usually extends beyond the city limits' and in the larger markets,
'may extend into several adjoining counties.' "425 U.S. at 299, quoting DEP'T OF HUD,
FHA TECHNIQUES OF HOUSING MARKET ANALYSIS 12 (Jan. 1970).
33. 425 U.S. at 299.
34. Id. at 303. HUD's Project Criteria for evaluation of 98 applications indicates its
responsibility to locate housing projects in integrated neighborhoods: "The site shall not
be located in. . . an area of minority concentration. . . [or a] racially mixed area if the
project will cause a significant increase in the proportion of minority to non-minority
residents in the area." 24 C.F.R. § 880.112(c) (1976). Also, "[t]he site shall promote
greater choice of housing opportunities and avoid undue concentration of assisted
persons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons." Id. at §
880.112(d).
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the new section eight program,35 the major housing program operated
by HUD, local governments have the right to comment on and, "in
certain specified circumstances, to preclude the Secretary of HUD
from approving the application.' '36
The Supreme Court may, however, have overemphasized the degree
of autonomy retained by local governments. 37 The decision to apply for
HUD funds will not be voluntary for those communities needing HUD
resources. In practice, communities are often compelled to apply for
HUD funds, potentially bringing themselves within the scope of Gaut-
reauxi.38 Secondly, a local government's power to preclude the Secre-
35. Section 8 provides financial support for lower-income families to live in already
constructed housing which meets statutory qualifications. The Secretary of HUD is
authorized to make assistance payments to the owners of these dwelling units, either
directly or through a public housing agency. HCDA § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (Supp. IV
1974). The section 8 program has largely replaced the traditional low-income housing
programs. 425 U.S. at 303.
For fiscal year 1975 estimated contract payments under the section 8 program were
approximately $10,700,000 as compared to a total estimated payment of $16,350,000
for all federal subsidized housing programs. The comparable figures for fiscal year
1976 indicate that $22,725,000 of a total $24,800,000 in estimated contractual pay-
ments are to be made under the section 8 program.
Id. at 303-04 n.19.
36. 425 U.S. at 304. The Court referred to HCDA §§ 213(a)-213(c), 42 U.S.C. §§
1439(a)-1439(c) (Supp. IV. 1974).
37. The autonomy reserved to the local governments differs depending on whether
the HUD Program is a traditional one or a section 8 program. Under the traditional
programs HUD makes loans for the construction of housing projects and provides
annual subsidies to retain the low-income character of the project. HCDA § 201(a), 42
U.S.C. §§ 1437b, 1437c (Supp. IV 1974). The traditional programs allow a local govern-
ment to retain the most control. The local government has the option of applying for
HUD funds or, if a local housing authority (LHA) applies for funds, approval by the
local government is essential before the Secretary of HUD may contract with the LHA.
Id. § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(e)(2). A local housing authority is "any. . .governmen-
tal entity or public body (or agency or instrumentality thereof) which is authorized to
engage in or assist in the development or operation of low-income housing." Id. § 201(a),
42 U.S.C. § 1437a(6).
The Section 8 program provides for rent supplements to low-income families to live in
already constructed housing. Id. § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. The LHA's contract with
HUD and then contract with private owners, or HUD may contract directly with private
owners. Id. § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1). The role of the local government is thus
reduced considerably. The only opportunity for input from the local government for a
section 8 program within its boundaries is provided for in HCDA § 213, 42 U.S.C. § 1439
(Supp. IV 1974). This section allows a government to object only if the anticipated
section 8 program conflicts with the community's housing assistance plan. See Fishman,
Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974: New Federal and Local
Dynamics in Community Development, 7 URBAN LAW. 189, 202-03 (1975).
38. Of the 1349 communities eligible for funds under the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, only 17 did not apply. This indicates that very few com-
munities can afford to pass up federal funds for which they are qualified simply because
they prefer not to bring themselves within federal guidelines such as the HUD order.
[Vol. 13:251
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tary of Hud from approving applications may be more limited than the
Court indicated. Section 213 of the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974 (HCDA)39 provides that upon receipt of an applica-
tion for housing assistance from a public housing authority, the Secre-
tary of HUD must provide the relevant local government an opportuni-
ty to comment on the application. The local government may object to
the application only if it believes that the application is inconsistent
with its own housing assistance plan. A housing assistance plan must
be submitted if the community wants to qualify for any funds under
HCDA. 40 Since the housing assistance plan must comply with federal
guidelines and objectives, it is doubtful that a housing assistance
application which complies with a remedial court order will be incon-
sistent with a community's housing assistance plan. The remedial court
order and the housing assistance plan both must promote integration. 41
Telephone interview with Mr. Daniel Louck, Director of the Data System and Statistics
Division, Office of Management under the Secretary for Community Planning and
Development, Washington, D.C. It should be noted that the above figures represent the
number of communities eligible for funds under the entire Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 18, 20,
23, 26, 31, 38, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV. 1974)), not just under the Housing provisions
of Title II. Most communities are anxious to apply for Title I funds (Community
Development) (HCDA §§ 101-118, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (Supp. IV 1974)) since the use
of these funds is relatively unrestricted and provides considerable flexibility for the
community. Fishman, supra note 37, at 202-03. In order to apply for these funds
however, a community must submit a Housing Assistance Plan (HAP), HCDA §
104(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1974). To prepare the Housing Assistance
Plan, a community must survey the assistance needs of resident lower-income persons,
specify a realistic, annual goal of units which will be built for these persons, and indicate
the general locations for such housing units. Id. In this sense a community must commit
itself to provide public housing if it wants to qualify for Title I funds. In this indirect
manner, many communities are forced to seek public housing funds if they want to
qualify for the highly desirable Title I funds.
39. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 18, 20, 23, 26, 31, 38, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1974)).
40. Every application for community development funds must include a housing
assistance plan. Id. § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a). See note 38 supra.
Section 213 of HCDA, 42 U.S.C. § 1439(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1974), provides that within
10 days of receiving an application for housing assistance under the major housing acts
the Secretary of HUD must notify the relevant local government. The local government
may then object to approval of the application "on the grounds that the application is
inconsistent with its housing assistance plan." Id. If the local government objects "the
Secretary may not approve the application unless he determines that the application is
consistent with such housing assistance plan." Id. § 213, 42 U.S.C. § 1439(a)(2).
41. The housing assistance plan must indicate the general location of proposed
low-income housing "with the objective of . . .promoting greater choice of housing
opportunities and avoiding undue concentrations of assisted persons in areas containing
a high proportion of low-income persons .. " Id. § 104(a)(4)(c), 42 U.S.C. §
5304(a)(4)(C). As the Supreme Court acknowledged, "[i]n view of these requirements of
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Finally, the HUD Secretary makes the final determination as to
whether the application is indeed inconsistent and thus whether it will
be funded.42 Given these limitations on the community's opportunity to
object, the "certain specified circumstances" in which a local govern-
ment may preclude the Secretary from approving an application appear
to be very few. By overemphasizing the control retained by local
governments the Supreme Court deemphasized the actual impact of
the HUD order on local governments, especially those dependent on
HUD funds.
Despite this problem in the Court's analysis, the Gautreaux opinion
provides guidelines to determine what circumstances will warrant a
metropolitan remedy. The most important factor is the extent to which
the order will affect the innocent governmental entities which may be
involved. In Milliken, the Court refused to approve a metropolitan
remedy since innocent suburban school districts would have been
consolidated or restructured.43 On the other hand, in Gautreaux the
Court permitted metropolitan relief since, in view of the Court's
analysis, the potential effect on local governments appeared minimal.
Because the Court deemphasized the potential effect of its decision on
local governments it is not clear how closely one must scrutinize the
impact of the metropolitan remedy on local governments. When the
practical effects of the Gautreaux decision are considered, however, it
is apparent that some local governments will never be affected by the
decision (i.e., those communities which do not need HUD funds).
Moreover, even those governments which are within the scope of the
remedial order will not necessarily be drastically affected. At most
such local governments will be forced to locate public housing in
different areas of their municipality because of the decision 4 This
impact is insignificant when compared with the substantial effect the
Milliken order would have had on local school boards.
Although the Supreme Court stressed the impact on innocent gov-
ernmental entities is the decisive factor in assessing the validity of a
metropolitan order,45 other factors in Gautreaux made it an ideal case
the Act, the location of subsidized housing in predominantly white areas of suburban
municipalities may well be consistent with the communities' housing assistance plans."
425 U.S. at 305 n.21.
42. See note 40 supra.
43. 418 U.S. at 743-47.
44. Arguably, however, the location of public housing within a particular community
may generate significant adverse reaction by neighborhood residents. Adverse commu-
nity sentiment may in turn create problems for the local government.
45. "[T]he Court's decision [in Milliken] rejecting the metropolitan area desegrega-
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for the Supreme Court to declare metropolitan relief appropriate.
Because of the segregated nature of Chicago, a metropolitan remedy
was essential to provide integrated housing opportunities. 46 Second,
the decision merely reinforces HUD's established guidelines to pro-
mote integration. 47 A district court order stands on very firm ground
when the violating agency, by its own guidelines, acknowledges its
responsibilities. Third, unlike the order in Milliken which was ad-
dressed to the state of Michigan, 48 the Gautreaux decision was addres-
sed to a federal agency.49 The federalism problem was thus not as
significant in Gautreaux.50 Fourth, unlike many school segregation
cases, 5' a housing segregation case more readily lends itself to a met-
ropolitan remedy. As HUD acknowledged, for purposes of plaintiffs'
housing opportunities, the relevant geographical area "is the Chicago
housing market, not the Chicago city limits.' '52
While the above considerations rendered Gautreaux an appropriate
tion order was actually based on fundamental limitations on the remedial powers of the
federal courts to restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities." 425
U.S. at 293. "The District Court's desegregation order in Milliken was held to be an
impermissible remedy . . . because it contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the
operation of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any constitutional
violation." Id. at 296. "The more substantial question under Milliken is whether an
order against HUD affecting its conduct beyond Chicago's boundaries would impermis-
sibly interfere with local governments and suburban housing authorities not implicated in
HUD's unconstitutional conduct." Id. at 300. "Here unlike . . . Milliken, a judicial
order directing relief beyond the boundary lines of Chicago will not necessarily entail
coercion of uninvolved governmental units." Id. at 298.
46. The Seventh Circuit found: "After careful consideration and reflection we are
obliged to conclude that on the record here it is necessary and equitable that any
remedial plan to be effective must be on a suburban or metropolitan area basis."
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom.
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
47. See note 34 supra.
48. 418 U.S. at 748.
49. 425 U.S. at 296.
50. This may or may not be a significant difference. For even when a metropolitan
remedial order is addressed to a federal agency the question remains to what degree
innocent governmental entities are affected by the agency's implementation of the order.
This question, however, would seem to present a less direct federalism problem because
there is no initial inquiry into the federal court's power to order a federal agency to act.
51. Especially in northern school segregation cases a court confronts the problem of
whether it may order a metropolitan remedy which encompassese innocent governmen-
tal entities. Northern school districts are usually drawn along municipal lines, while
southern school districts often cover entire counties. Therefore a southern school
district would tend to cover an entire metropolitan area and an order directed to the
district would be metropolitan in scope. Note, Interdistrict School Desegregation Rem-
edies After Milliken v. Bradley, 56 B.U.L. REV. 357-58 (1976).
52. 425 U.S. at 299; see note 32 supra.
1977]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
case in which to grant metropolitan relief, the decision should not be
read to require all of these factors before a metropolitan remedy is
permissible. To do so would allow district courts to grant metropolitan
relief only rarely, for very few cases will present this same fact
pattern.53 Gautreaux should instead be read more broadly. While a
favorable balance of the above factors is important, the essential
criterion in determining whether a metropolitan remedy is permissible
in the absence of a metropolitan violation is the impact of such a
remedial order on innocent governmental units.
Pamela Bucy
53. See, e.g., Vann v. Kansas City Housing Auth., No. 76-CV-72-W-3 (W.D. Mo.,
filed Feb. 5, 1976), reported in 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 888 (1976). Since the same facts
present in Gautreaux appear to be present in Vann, the district court should be in a
strong position to grant metropolitan relief. Plaintiffs charged the Kansas City Housing
(KCHA) Authority and HUD with causing "racial impaction within public housing units
in Kansas City" by site location and tenant selection procedures. They also claim that
HUD's implementation of the section 8 program (see note 37) supra has contributed to
racial impaction by confining eligible dwelling units to those which are older and located
in declining areas of the city. Plaintiffs seek metropolitan relief in two ways: (I) they
want new units constructed outside of Kansas City but within the metropolitan area, and
(2) they want section 8 procedures revised so the section 8 tenant may live outside
Kansas City. See 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 888 (1976).
Because the fact pattern is almost identical to Gautreaux, all factors in Gautreaux
appear to be present in Vann. A remedial order would be addressed to HUD, a federal
agency which operates on a metropolitan basis, reinforcing HUD's already existing
responsibilities. The effect of the order on innocent local governments would be mini-
mal. As in Gautreaux, the governments voluntarily apply for funds, and have the
opportunity to object to the project. The only significant difference between Vann and
Gautreaux is the challenge in Vann to HUD's implementation of the section 8 program.
Remedial action which is also addressed to HUD's performance under section 8 would
not appear to alter the propriety of a metropolitan order by impermissibly interfering
with local governments. Although HUD's section 8 procedures were not specifically
challenged in Gautreaux, the Supreme Court discussed the section 8 program and
concluded that because the local governments retained sufficient power to object to
applications, a metropolitan remedial order would not impermissibly interfere with their
activities. 425 U.S. at 303-05.
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